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Abstract. User access control in sensor networks deﬁnes a process of
granting user the access right to the information and resources. It is es-
sential for the future real sensor network deployment in which sensors
may provide users with diﬀerent services in terms of data and resource
access. A centralized access control mechanism requires base station to
be involved whenever a user requests to get authenticated and access the
information stored in the sensor node, which is ineﬃcient, not scalable,
and is exposed to many potential attacks along the long communica-
tion path. In this paper, we propose a distributed user access control
under a realistic adversary model in which sensors can be compromised
and user may collude. We split the access control into local authen-
tication conducted by the sensors physically close to the user, and a
light remote authentication based on the endorsement of the local sen-
sors. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), a public key cryptography
scheme, is used for local authentication. We implement the access con-
trol protocols on a testbed of TelosB motes. Our analysis and experi-
mental results show that our scheme is feasible for real access control
requirement.
1 Introduction
Access control deﬁnes a process of identifying user and granting user the access
right to information or resources. Sensor network is a computing platform for
users to collect data, transmit data, and process data. The access control per-
taining to sensor network predominantly aims to protect the network usage and
collected data. Unauthorized user should not be allowed to use the network since
network bandwidth is very limited and, more importantly, the battery power of
each node may be depleted after malicious users aggressively eﬀuse messages to
the network. The data collected or processed, many times, is classiﬁed so that
data of diﬀerent classiﬁcations requires security clearance for authorized access.
For example, a high rank oﬃcer may need to know more information about the
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ﬁeld deployment than a soldier. In another scenario, information may be sensi-
tive compartmented so that users have to be denied of access to the data that
is beyond his access right. An example would be a user is authorized to access
the data from the sensors in his oﬃce, but not other people’s oﬃces.
To achieve access control, it is essential for sensor nodes to authenticate the
identities of the requesters. This paper aims to explore an eﬃcient and secure
authentication scheme for the sensor nodes. A natural way for the authentication
check is to use a centralized mechanism. After receiving a request, the sensor
node sends the user information to the base station. Then the base station de-
cides whether the access is granted or not and replies the result to the sensor
node. This solution may yield a good security result because of the fact that
the base station is considered secure, and the communication channels between
sensors and the base station are assumed secure. However, this scheme suﬀers
two major problems. First, the centralized authentication requires at least one
round-trip communication between the sensor and the base station. If a num-
ber of users are accessing the network at the same time, the authentication
traﬃc may easily cause network congestion. Second, this authentication pattern
is vulnerable to adversary’s DoS attacks. The sensor nodes have no knowledge
about user access right until they get replies from the base station. The adver-
sary can easily launch DoS attacks by forging a large number of user access re-
quests, which will in-turn trigger the same amount of authentication traﬃc. The
consequence will severely saturate the network and quickly deplete the sensor
node power.
This paper gives a thorough exploration for sensor network data access con-
trol problem in a general setting. We consider a data access scenario that a user
can access in-network stored data at any location from anywhere in the net-
work, which includes local data access from user’s nearby sensors and remote
data access. Moreover, we consider access control problem in a much harsher
environment in which the users may collude and sensors may be compromised.
Compromised sensors can get the information from the user authentication pro-
cess and may disclose this information to an adversary, which may potentially
help the adversary to gain more access privileges. Colluding users may analyze
their information and design a scheme to counteract the access control system.
Besides, we also addresses node duplication attack and DoS attack by inundating
authentication messages to the network.
It is our belief that our more general data access model and realistic adversary
threat model deﬁne a very realistic problem for future sensor deployment. Our
work has following four contributions. First, we propose a practical and scalable
certiﬁcate-based local authentication based on ECC. Public key cryptography
eliminates the complicated key management and pre-distribution required by
symmetric key schemes, and provides a very clean interface between the user
and sensors. The advantage of certiﬁcate-based authentication is that sensors do
not need the storage for user’s public keys or a third party for public key veriﬁ-
cation. User public keys can be constructed from user certiﬁcates and published
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authenticate a user locally by a group of sensors and transfer the endorsement
to the remote sensor. This scheme is resilient to limited number of compromised
sensors and the DoS attack launched in the form of remote authentication. Third,
our scheme eliminates the possibility of user collusion attack. The polynomial
based secret sharing scheme proposed in [18] suﬀers user collusion attack. The
collusion by a number of users can easily reconstruct the secret polynomial and
reveal the system secrecy. Our certiﬁcate-based authentication is resilient to any
user collusion attack. Fourth, we show our scheme is feasible in real sensor net-
work deployment. We have implemented both local authentication and remote
authentication on TelosB motes, which are based on our implementation of 160-
bit ECC security primitives. Since the TelosB hardware multiplier is disabled in
TinyOS, the computation is longer that it should be. It takes 3.1s to generate a
public key and 10.8s to conduct local authentication.
2 Related Work
We believe that, with fast expanding sensor network technologies, more services
will be available to allow direct interactions between users and sensor nodes.
Obviously, the new communication paradigm poses more security challenges for
small and power constrained sensor nodes. Diﬀerent from the security problem
in user access control we address in this paper, most related researches focus on
secure and resilient communication links and resource management inside the
networks.
Perrig et al. [12] construct μTesla and introduce the asymmetric mechanism
through a delayed symmetric keys disclosure: the base station broadcasts an
encrypted message ﬁrst, and then releases the secret key in scheduled time frame.
Although KDC-based schemes suﬀer the scalability problem, broadcasting is still
the basic, eﬃcient to distribute or revoke secret keys in sensor networks.
Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random graph based key pre-distribution
scheme [7]. The scheme assigns each sensor a random subset of keys from a
large key pool, and allows any two nodes to ﬁnd one common key and use
that key as their shared symmetric key. Based on their contribution, a number
of researches [3,5] have delivered to strengthen the security and improve the
eﬃciency. Since each sensor node only needs to store a small number of keys, the
random graph based schemes have the advantage of scalability. However, in a
sparse network or non-uniform distributed network, the key establishment could
be diﬃcult because a number of sensor pairs may not successfully ﬁnish pairwise
key establishment.
Besides the above two types of security schemes, a number of research teams
focus on the group key and authentication problems [17,15,1,14,6,2]. Ye et
al. [17] design a Statistical En-Route Filtering (SEF) mechanism to detect and
drop false reports. The idea is to use probabilistic key sharing to authenticate
the legitimate messages on the routing path. However, SEF cannot be used to
authenticate the message sender because the remote sensor does not have enough
knowledge (as the sink) to verify the message source.308 H. Wang and Q. Li
Zhang et al. [18] propose several schemes to restrict and revoke the access
privilege of a mobile sink. Their approaches are based on Blundo’s scheme to
establish secret key between the mobile sink and sensor nodes, and then use
Merkle tree technique to reduce the overhead. The limitation of the scheme is
that the mobile sink’s moving track has to be predetermined by the base station.
Compared with our scheme, we address a more general user/sensor communica-
tion problem. The mobile sink can be regarded as one type of special users in
our scheme.
3S y s t e m M o d e l
We consider a large scale wireless sensor network deployed in a variety of en-
vironments, e.g., at a hostile battleﬁeld, in an oﬃce building, or in a national
park. Data access to the stored data on each node is protected according to
the attributes of the data, e.g., data type (temperature, light, noise, etc.), data
location, data collection time, and so on. For a certain data, only authorized
user can access the data from the storing node. Since the data is distributed
in the entire network instead of in a central position, data protection by re-
lying on a powerful sink node with all data access authorization information
and computational power is not possible. Instead, data access authorization
should be done in a distributed fashion accordingly. After the data access has
been authorized, data access is granted to the user and data is transfered to
the user.
A user equipped with a powerful computing device, such as a PDA, interacts
with the sensor network for data query and retrieval and maybe network control
such as network reconﬁguration or sensing mode change. The PDA is the inter-
face for the user to talk to the sensor network. The computing device is more
powerful than the sensor nodes, so it is capable of more computationally inten-
sive tasks. User can query data at any location of the network through sensor
node relay. The data access capability, however, must be granted by a central
authorization center before data access. A data access list is associated with the
user about the types, locations, and the durations of the authorized data access.
This information is encrypted in a way that the user is unable to forge and can
be authenticated by the sensor holding the requested data.
The sensor network is managed by a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which is
responsible for generating all security primitives (i.e., random numbers, one-way
hash function, message authentication code (MAC), access list) and revoking
users’ access privilege if necessary. KDC distributes secret keys through the
base stations. To access the sensor network, users need to apply for the access
permission from KDC. KDC maintains a user access list pool and associated user
identiﬁcations. The access list deﬁnes the user’s access privilege. A typical access
list is composed of uid and user access privilege mask. uid is a unique number to
identify the user. user access privilege mask is a number of binary bits; each bit
represents a speciﬁc information or service. An access list example is shown in
Fig 1. The information stored at the sensor nodes is divided into multiple access
privilege levels. The user with a lower access privilege is not allowed to get theDistributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks 309
64 : 23  :  00 : 07 : E9 : 26 : F1 : A5
privilege mask timestamp uid
Fig.1. An example of user access list. The access list is composed of three parts: uid,
access privilege mask,a n dtimestamp. uid is a unique number assigned to each user.
access privilege mask is to deﬁne the user’s access privilege to the system information.
timestamp speciﬁes the access list is only valid in a certain time frame.
information that requires the higher privilege. We assume the users can securely
acquire their access lists from KDC through out-of-band secure communication
channels. Once a user passes the authentication check, the sensor nodes provide
their local information to the user. If the required information is not available
locally, for the reason we will discuss later, a group of sensor nodes have to
collaborate and request the information from the remote sensor which holds the
information.
An adversaryis assumed to use all possible means to access the data that is not
authorized to him. He can eavesdropmessage transmissionto extract transmitted
information or carry out message replay. Message eavesdrop and replay are easy
to handle, as discussed by many papers, by using regular message encryption
and including message sequence or time information. More hazard is created
when nodes are compromised by the adversary who is able to garner all the
information stored in the sensors. It is even worse that the adversary may inject
his own program to the compromised sensors, which, under the control of the
adversary, pretend to be trustworthy gaining as much information as possible.
A user may also collude with the adversary for mutual beneﬁt by attacking the
access control system. The base station and the central authorization center
cannot be compromised, however.
We mainly consider the following two potential attacks. First, Compromised
sensors may capture much information and give to an unauthorized user so that
that user may access data by impersonating another user. Second, user collusion
may help users to subvert the system and gain more access right than that
of anyone among the colluding users. We assume that at most t sensors can
be compromised. The assumption is reasonable because compromising sensors
takes time and eﬀort. On the other hand, we assume unbounded number of users
can collude since it is not hard for mischievous users to share information and
orchestrate an aggregated analysis to the collected information. The fact that
a compromised sensor is hard to identify prevents a user from trusting any of
the sensors. A user may have to disclose information for authentication, but the
revealed information has to be speciﬁc to the sensor in contact and should not
be used for authentication at another sensor.
We do not explicitly address the introduction of duplicated compromised sen-
sors. However, since the duplicated compromised sensors do not introduce more
information to the adversary, our carefully designed protocols do not enable the
adversary to access the data from an uncompromised sensor.310 H. Wang and Q. Li
4 Proposed Access Control Schemes
The user may request data stored locally or in a distant sensor. We ﬁrst deﬁne
following two types of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes which are directly within
the contact range of the user are called local sensor nodes. The sensor nodes
which cannot establish direct communication link with the user but hold the
requested information are called remote sensor nodes.
In this section, we ﬁrst propose a public-key cryptography based local access
control scheme. Then we develop a remote access control approach (we assume
that the ID of the remote sensor for data access is known by some scheme that is
beyond the scope of this paper, e.g., resource discovery or geographic or location-
based routing). Finally, we provide the security analysis for both schemes.
4.1 PKC Based Local Authentication
Public-key cryptography has been used extensively in data encryption, digital
signature, user authentication, etc. Compared with the popular symmetric key
cryptography widely used in sensor network, public-key cryptography provides a
more ﬂexible and simple interface requiring no complicated key pre-distribution
and management as in symmetric-key schemes. It is a popular belief, however,
in sensor network research community that public-key cryptography is not prac-
tical because the required computational intensity is not suitable for resource
constrained sensor nodes. The nascent exploration seems to disabuse of the mis-
conception. The recent progress in 160-bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
implementation [9] on Atmel ATmega128, a CPU of 8Hz and 8 bits, shows that
an ECC point multiplication takes less than one second, which proves public-key
cryptography is feasible for sensor network security related applications.
We present our ECC based local authentication scheme as follows. KDC
selects a particular elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(p)( w h e r ep is a prime),
and publishes base point P with order q (where q is also a large prime). KDC
picks a random number x ∈ GF(q) as the system private key, and publishes its
corresponding public key Q = x×P. Given point P and Q, it is computationally
infeasible to get system secret x.
A straightforward user authentication scheme can be described as follows.
The user uses her private key to sign her access list and sends to the sensors.
The sensors just verify the signature by using user’s public key. However, it is
diﬃcult for the sensors to ﬁnd an authorized third party to certify that the
user is who she claims to be. To solve this problem, we adopt the certiﬁcate-
based authentication in our local authentication scheme. To access the sensor
network, the user has to present her certiﬁcate ﬁrst. Based on the certiﬁcate,
the sensors generate user’s public key, and then use the derived public key to
encrypt a random number as the challenge. If the user can successfully decrypt
the message, then the local sensors are convinced that the user’s certiﬁcate is
legitimate.
Initially, the user comes to KDC to apply for an access list to visit the sensor
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user’s public key constructor CA = cA × P. Based on the user’s request, KDC
issues a proper access control list acA, and attaches it to public constructor
CA as the certiﬁcate, denoted as TA. Meanwhile, a digest eA is generated for
TA,w h e r eeA = H(TA)( H is a {0,1}∗ →{ 0,1}q hash function). Then, KDC
constructs Alice’s private key qA = eAcA+x and public key QA = eA×CA +Q.
Note qA and QA satisfy QA = qA × P. Finally, Alice holds qA, QA and TA.W e
assume above procedure is conducted at an out-of-band secure channel.
The user authentication protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2. We denote sl as a
local sensor. When the user approaches a sensor node sl, she sends her access
request with certiﬁcate TA. Given certiﬁcate TA, sl constructs user’s public key
QA = eA × CA + Q. To verify the user indeed holds private key qA,n o d esl
uses the challenge as follows. sl selects a random number r ∈ GF(p) (to be
used as the session key with the user), and calculate its hash H(r)o v e rG F ( p ) .
Node sl then generates temporary public key Yr = H(r) × P, and computes
Zr = H(r) × QA.N e x t ,sl encrypts the session key by doing r ⊕ X(Zr), where
X(Zr) is the X coordinate of point Zr. Finally, sl sends ciphertext  zr,Y r  to
the user, attached with the MAC of a nonce (NA), MAC(r,NA).
With private key qA, the user can regenerate Zr because qA × Yr = qA ×
H(r) × P = H(r) × QA = Zr. She then decrypts session key r = zr ⊕ X(Zr),
and veriﬁes if Yr = H(r) × P. If yes, She uses r as the session key to generate
MAC for nonce NA concatenated with her access privilege acA, and sends to sl.
Local sensor sl decrypts the MAC message and veriﬁes NA and acA.As u c -
cessful veriﬁcation proves that the user is the owner of certiﬁcate TA. Finally,
sl replies the information requested by the user, which again is encrypted by
session key r.
user → sl : TA =( CA|acA)
sl computes : QA = eA × CA + Q
: picks a random r ∈ GF(p)
: Zr = H(r) × QA,
: Yr = H(r) × P,
: zr = r ⊕ X(Zr),
: MAC(r,NA).
sl → usesr : zr,Y r,MAC(r,NA)
user computes : qA × Yr = qA × H(r) × P = Zr
: X(Zr) ⊕ zr = r
:d e c r y p t sMAC(r,NA)
user → sl : MAC(r,NA|acA)
sl → user : MAC(r,reply)
Fig.2. User access list authentication protocol. We let sl be the local sensor, TA be
the user certiﬁcate, which includes a public-key constructor CA and an access list acA.312 H. Wang and Q. Li
4.2 Remote Access Control
In remote access control, the remote sensor node cannot directly contact the user
due to the limitation of radio transmission range. Therefore, the user queries
have to travel multiple hops to reach the remote sensor. With this communi-
cation pattern, the authentication schemes used in local access control cannot
be applied on remote access control. In other words, it is improper for the user
to directly contact the remote sensor. Otherwise the adversary can easily take
the advantage and launch the bogus data injection attack to deplete the sensor
network. With the above security concern in mind, we develop a remote access
scheme that uses local sensors to endorse the user query to the remote sensor.
Since it is widely accepted [11,12] that a single sensor node cannot be trusted,
the user’s remote access request has to be endorsed by k local sensor nodes,
where k is a system parameter. We assume the adversary cannot compromise k
sensors at a time. Any user remote access query without k local endorsements
will be dropped immediately by either forwarding sensor nodes or the remote
sensor. A caveat is that some sensors may be compromised if a valid user can-
not be authenticated by a group of sensors. In that case, the user can move to
ﬁnd another group of sensors for authentication or report the failure to the base
station for analysis.
The requirement of local sensor endorsement raises a new security challenge:
how does the remote sensor verify that the user is indeed endorsed by k local
sensors? If each local endorsing sensor can share a secret with the remote sen-
sor, then the endorsement can be easily veriﬁed by the remote sensor. We use
polynomial-based scheme for secret sharing between the local and remote sen-
sors. More speciﬁcally, the KDC randomly generates a bivariate t-degree poly-
nomial f(x,y)=
t
i,j=0 aijxiyj over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(q), where q is a prime
number and aij = aji. The polynomial has the symmetric property such that
f(x,y)=f(y,x). In practice, we select t = k − 1 so that the polynomial can
not be reconstructed by the adversary with the assumption that the adversary
cannot compromise up to k sensors. To endorse a user access list, each local
sensor can encrypt the access list with the key shared with the remote sensor,
computed by substituting x and y with the sensor IDs. This scheme, however,
has to provide the remote sensor with the IDs of the local sensors for veriﬁcation,
which leads to a long message. In order to reduce the message size, before the
deployment, sensor nodes are divided into k groups {g1,g 2,···,g k},w h e r egj
(1 ≤ j ≤ k) is a group ID. Besides the group ID, each sensor i has its unique
sensor ID si. From now on, we also denote a sensor node as s
j
i,w h e r esi is the
sensor ID, and j m e a n si ti sb e l o n gt og r o u pgj. During conﬁguration procedure,
each sensor s
j
i is pre-loaded with two shares of polynomial, f(x,si)a n df(x,gj).
Given the remote sensor ID sr,al o c a ls e n s o rs
j1
i1 can establish a pairwise key
with the remote sensor by plugging sjr
r in f(x,gj1). And, the remote sensor can
also generate the pairwise key by plugging group ID gj1 in its f(x,sr). To use
group ID instead of sensor ID, we can achieve a shorter message due to a small
number of groups. For the remote sensor to check the authentication list, we
attach a bitmap for the groups in the message showing which group IDs areDistributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks 313
user ﬁnds k local sensors s
j
i with diﬀerent j
user → s1,···,s k(k
 ≥ k): b c a s t .r e q u e s t
s1,···,s k → user :g r o u p i d
user → sp1,···,s pk : conﬁrm request
for (each sensor s
gi
pi,i=1 , 2, ··· ,k)
s
gi
pi authenticate user access list TA
s
gi
pi → user : maci = MAC(f(sr,g i),ac A)
user computes: mac = H(mac1||···||mack)
user → sr : MAC(mac,acA||NA)||acA|| group list
sr : compute f(g1,s r),···,f(gk,s r)
sr :r e c o n s t r u c tmac = Hash(mac1||···||mack)
sr : decrypt and verify acA
sr → user : MAC(mac,reply||NA||NB)
Fig.3. The polynomial based remote access control protocol
used for authentication. We incorporate the remote sensor ID in the polynomial
computation rather than the group ID of the remote sensor to avoid the attack
due to the scenario that a compromised sensor has the same group ID with the
remote sensor and then can decode the shared keys between the local sensors
and the remote sensor.
The remote access control protocol is described in Fig. 3. To start a remote
access procedure, the user has to ﬁnd k endorsing sensors s
j
i such that no two
sensors have the same group ID. The user ﬁrst broadcasts the remote access
request, and the local sensors receiving the request reply with their group ID.
The user then select k local sensors with diﬀerent group ID to form an en-
dorsing sensor group. Note the user may have to broadcast the request several
times due to the possible transmission collisions. Then, each endorsing sensor
conducts the local authentication as described previously. After the user has
been authenticated, sensor s
j
i computes the pairwise key f(sr,g i)w i t ht h er e -
mote sensor, and uses the key to encrypt user’s access list acA. Note only the
access list part of certiﬁcate TA is encrypted because the remote sensor does not
need user’s public key constructor CA. The user collects k MACs from the en-
dorsing sensors and generates a hash digest, mac = H(mac1||···||mack), where
g1 <g 2 < ···<g k.
After computing the hash digest, the user encrypts her access list acA and
NA with mac. Again, NA is a nonce to guarantee the message freshness. Then,
the user sends it along with her access list acA and the local endorsing sensor
group list, to the remote sensor.
When a remote sensor (denoted as sr) receives the access request from the
user, sr retrieves the information in the group list and user access list to recon-
struct the MAC digest as shown in the protocol, and then decrypts the user’s
access list acA. If the decrypted access list matches the one provided by the314 H. Wang and Q. Li
user, it proves that the user has already been authenticated by k local sensors.
Sensor sr replies the user with the requested information, along with nonce NB
randomly picked by sr. Again, all data is encrypted by mac.
4.3 Security Analysis
In both access control schemes, the authentication messages are encrypted by
MAC algorithm in the access control protocol, except the user certiﬁcate. As
long as the MAC algorithm is secure (such as RC5[13]), and the secret key is
large enough (at least 64 bits), any number of compromised sensors cannot break
the ciphertext in the messages.
In the local authentication, the sensor nodes can not capture any secret
from the user, nor can the user gain more access privilege than granted due
to the nice security features of public-key cryptography. The 160-bit elliptic-
curve crypto-system is considered to have the same security level as 1024-bit
RSA. Given an elliptic curve E over ﬁnite ﬁeld F, to ﬁnd system secret x
from the relation Q = xP (where P,Q are published system parameters) is
equivalent to solve the discrete logarithm problem, which is considered com-
putationally infeasible. During the local authentication procedure, user’s cer-
tiﬁcate TA including access list caA is transmitted in plaintext. The malicious
sensors may duplicate the user certiﬁcate, or the adversary may capture the
certiﬁcate by eavesdropping. The certiﬁcate information, however, can not help
the adversary to impersonate the user and get the data service. The reason
is that the local sensors use user’s public key to encrypt the challenge (ran-
dom number r). It is easy for the adversary to calculate the public key given
the stolen certiﬁcate, but it is computationally infeasible to acquire the associ-
ated private key. As the result, the adversary is not able to correctly respond
the challenge, so her access request will be rejected by any local sensor. Due
to the same reason, the user cannot forge or alter her access list to acquire
higher level access privileges or to extend the allowed access time period. Oth-
erwise, the user will not be able to decrypt the challenge message from the local
sensor because she does not have the private key associated to the certiﬁcate
she claims. More importantly, the certiﬁcate-based local authentication eﬀec-
tively defends against user collusion attacks. The collusion among any num-
ber of users does not jeopardize the system secret for the reason explained
above.
The security features of our remote access scheme lie on the local sensor group
endorsement. The combination of our local endorsement scheme with existing
false report ﬁltering schemes, such as SEF [17] and IHA [14], can eﬀectively
prevent the potential DoS attacks. In our scheme, users are not allowed to send
requests directly to the remote sensor. Any remote access request has to be
endorsed by k local sensors. Since the adversary can not compromise up to k
sensors (the system assumption), there is no way for an illegitimate user to
get k genuine MACs to access the remote sensor. If the adversary attempts to
forge k MACs, the bogus request will be immediately dropped by forwarding
sensors in false report ﬁltering. Again, the user still can not alter or forge herDistributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks 315
access list in the remote access request. The local endorsing sensors generate the
MACs using authenticated user access list. If the user forges her access list in
the remote access request, the MAC veriﬁcation at the remote sensor will fail,
and the remote request will be rejected.
5 Experimental Results
To evaluate the proposed access control schemes, we have implemented both lo-
cal access control and remote access control scheme on TelosB (TPR2420) motes,
the latest research oriented mote developed by UC Berkeley. TelosB is powered
by MSP430 microcontroller. MSP430 incorporates an 8MHz, 16-bit RISC CPU,
48K bytes ﬂash memory (ROM) and 10K RAM. The RF transceiver on TelosB
is IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee compliant, and can have 250kbps data rate. To simplify
the experiments, we have implemented the user module on TelosB motes instead
of PDAs.
5.1 Metrics and Methodology
We use four metrics: authentication time, computation cost, communication cost,
and power consumption, to evaluate the performance of access control protocols.
The authentication time measures user perceived waiting time from sending out
the access request to receiving the authentication conﬁrmation. Computation
cost is the amount of energy consumed in data processing. Similarly, communi-
cation cost is the energy used by RF transceiver. The power consumption is the
total amount of energy used by all participating sensor nodes to assist one user
access request.
Table 1. The amount of current draw on diﬀerent operations for TelosB motes
Operation Normal Max
MCU On, Radio Oﬀ 1.8mA 2.4mA
MCU On, Radio Rx 21.8mA 23mA
MCU On, Radio Tx 19.5mA 21mA
The energy consumption E can be calculated by E = U ·I ·t,w h e r eU is the
voltage, I is the current and t is the time duration. TelosB motes are powered
by two AA batteries, so U is approximately equal to 3 volts. The current value
varies in diﬀerent operations as shown in Table 1 (abstracted from [4]). We
use authentication time as the time duration for MCU data processing. And
communication time can be estimated by following way. Given 250kbps radio
transmission rate, and 38 bytes in each packet, it takes one sensor node 38 ×
8bits/250kbps=1 .2ms to transmit or receive a data packet. Without considering
message loss and retransmission, the total transmission time is the product of
1.2ms with the number of packets.316 H. Wang and Q. Li
5.2 Experiment of Local Access Control
We have implemented 160-bit ECC cryptosystem on TelosB motes. We choose
SECG recommended 160-bit elliptic curve, secp160r1, in our ECC implemen-
tation because large integer multiplication and reduction over prime number
ﬁnite ﬁeld can be more eﬀectively optimized than those over binary ﬁnite ﬁeld.
The most expensive operation in ECC exponentiation is point multiplication. To
achieve the better performance as possible, we have adopted a number of tech-
niques including hybrid multiplication, modular reduction over pseudo-Mersenne
prime ﬁeld, Great Division and mixed Jacobian Coordinate. Due to the space
limit, we omit the detail implementation and corresponding optimization of our
ECC implementation on TelosB motes. Interested readers may refer to [16] for
detail explanation. On average, it takes 3.1 seconds for a TelosB sensor mote to
do a ﬁxed point multiplication, and 3.5 seconds to do a random point multipli-
cation. Note this performance is achieved under the circumstance that TelosB
micro-controller’s hardware multiplier is disabled in TinyOS.
Our local access control implementation strictly follows the protocol presented
in section IV except that the data encryption/decryption part is not implemented
due to the reason that TinySec (which provides block-cipher module) does not
work with CC2420 radio module on TelosB, but it does not aﬀect our perfor-
mance evaluation because encryption/decryption overhead is negligible (e.g., in
RC5, the most expensive step (key setup) only costs 4ms on ATmega128 [8])
compared with ECC exponentiation.
The user certiﬁcate TA has 48 bytes, including 40-byte public key constructor
and 8-byte access list. The challenge from sensor nodes has 80 bytes, including
a 40 byte ECC point, 20 byte zr and a 20 byte ciphertext. Since one TelosB
packet only has 28 byte payload, the user has to use multiple packets to deliver
the certiﬁcate. In total, user needs to send four messages (three messages to
deliver user certiﬁcate, the forth one to response sensor’s challenge). Similarly,
the local sensor also needs to send four messages to deliver the challenge. We use
challenge generation time as our authentication delay. The challenge generation
time is user perceived delay from sending out the access request to receive the
challenge from the sensor. We exclude the user response time from the authen-
ticate delay because the user usually carry much more powerful devices in the
real world, so the response time is negligible compared with sensor processing
time.
Our experiment results show that a challenge generation costs 10.8 seconds
on average. Obviously, computation delay dominates communication delay in
this procedure. Recall that a sensor node needs to perform two ECC random
point multiplications and one ﬁxed point multiplication to generate a challenge.
The three point multiplications combined already contribute 10.1 second delay.
The communication delay to send/receive 8 packets only has 8 × 1.2ms =9 .6
milliseconds. The power consumption for the computation is 58.3mJ, while the
energy cost for the communication is 0.59mJ.Distributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks 317
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Fig.4. (a). The time consumption to generate a pairwise key from the polynomial.
(b). The power consumption to generate a pairwise key.
5.3 Experiment of Remote Access Control
The essential part of the experiment of remote access control is the polynomial
based local endorsement scheme and MAC recovery at the remote sensor. We
are particularly interested in the performance of the t-degree polynomial com-
putation in sensors. Given a share of the polynomial f(x)=a0+a1x+···+atxt
over GF(q), the computation of f(x)r e q u i r e st modular multiplications and t
modular additions, plus the computation of values x2,···,x t.At y p i c a lc r y p -
tosystem (e.g., RC5) suggests q should be at least 64 bits. Therefore, t 64-
bit × 64-bit modular multiplications are required to compute the polynomial.
On TelosB’s 16-bit CPU platform, each 64-bit × 64-bit multiplication costs 16
word multiplications. To reduce the computational cost, we adopt the simpli-
ﬁcation proposed in [10]. The simpliﬁcation is based on the fact that variable
x is either sensor ID or group ID, which is normally a 16-bit integer. We can
use another ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(q )f o rx,x2,···,x t. Therefore, the modular mul-
tiplication in polynomial f(x) is always performed between a 64-bit integer
and 16-bit integer. As the result, the cost of multiplication is reduced by four
times.
The modular reduction operation is as important as multiplication. Each mul-
tiplication must be followed by a reduction operation. To further reduce the
computational cost, we pick a pseudo-Mersenne prime as q because modular
reduction cost on ﬁeld of a pseudo-Mersenne prime can be optimized to a neg-
ligible amount. A pseudo-Mersenne prime can be represented as q =2 m − ω,
where ω< <2m.G i v e na2 m-bit multiplication result B =( b1,b 0), (b1,b 0 are two
m-bit halves), the reduction can be computed based on the congruence 2m ≡ ω:
(b1,b 0)=b1 ∗ ω + b0 → (b 
1,b  
0). Repeat this process until b 
1 = 0, the result is
B = b 
0 mod q.
In our experiment, we choose q =2 64 − 28 − 1, q  =2 16 −24 − 1. We test the
average time delay and power consumption for computing the polynomial with
diﬀerent t values. In each test, we randomly generate t+1 64-bit coeﬃcients and
a 16-bit variable x, we repeat 20 times to get the average time delay. The test
results are shown in Fig. 4.
The test results show the polynomial computation is eﬃcient in low-power
sensor nodes. The ﬁgure shows that the time consumption for generating a pair-318 H. Wang and Q. Li
wise key is only 8.8ms, 17.1ms, and 36.8ms, given the polynomial degree of 16,
32, and 64, respectively.
To evaluate the remote access control procedure, we divide the experiment
into two parts. The ﬁrst part includes local sensor discovery, local sensor au-
thentication and MAC collecting. In the second part, we perform the MAC re-
construction and veriﬁcation at the remo t es e n s o r .T h em e s s age routing between
t h eu s e ra n dt h er e m o t es e n s o ri sat y p i c a l communication process that has been
investigated extensively and the time delay is very small, so in our experiment
we omit the message routing between the user and the remote sensor.
During the experiment, we assume the sensor ﬁeld is dense enough so that
the user can reach local sensors from diﬀerent groups without moving. To ac-
quire the endorsements from local sensors, the user ﬁrst broadcasts a remote
access request. Each local sensor replies the user with its group ID. The user
picks those sensors from diﬀerent groups to ﬁll in her endorse list. Due to the
message collision, some replying messages are corrupted, so the user may not
ﬁnd enough endorsing sensors with one broadcast. As the result, the user may
have to broadcast several times to ﬁnd all k endorsing nodes. Our experiments
show the user has to broadcast at least twice if k ≥ 6. After successfully ﬁnding
k endorsing sensors, the user unicasts an endorse acknowledge to each of the k
sensors. The endorsing sensors processes the user authentication in parallel. The
user ﬁrst broadcasts her certiﬁcate, and then sequentially receives and responses
each local sensor’s challenge. A simple scheduling algorithm can be used for the
endorsing sensors to send challenges without packet collision. In our implemen-
tation, we arrange the endorsing sensors to send the challenge in ascending order
of their group IDs. If the user is successfully authenticated, then each endorsing
sensor generates the MAC and returns it to the user. After collecting all k MACs
from endorsing sensors, the user ﬁnally generates a MAC digest and sends the
access request to the remote sensor. We perform the experiment with k changing
from 2 to 16. The result of endorsing time consumption is shown in Fig. 5(a).
Note that the time duration includes the time for user’s broadcasts for request,
receiving the group ID reply from sensors, unicasts to sensors for acknowledging
receiving their group IDs, and sensor nodes’ data processing time to generate
the MACs.
We ﬁrst perform a separate experiment just to test the time delay to ﬁnd k
sensors only (without local authentication and MAC generation). The result is
shown as the dotted line in the same Fig. 5(a). It is interesting to ﬁnd that it
takes 105ms to ﬁnd just 2 endorsing sensors and considerable time for discover-
ing 4, 8, and 16 sensors, which is surprisingly slow, considering 1ms transmit-
ting/receiving delay. Two factors contribute to the long delay. First, as discussed
in previous section, the user may not get all information from local endorsing
sensors after the ﬁrst broadcast. The user may have to broadcast the request
more than twice. Second, more importantly, a timer is set between any two
broadcasts in our implementation to regulate the packet transmission and re-
ception. Every time the timer ﬁres, the user checks whether the endorsing list
is complete. If not complete, the user will do broadcast again. The time delayDistributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks 319
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Fig.5. (a). The solid line shows the time duration for the user to get authenticated
by k local sensor, k is changing from 1 to 16. The dotted line reveals the time delay
for the user to ﬁnd k endorsing sensors; (b). The time duration for remote sensor to
verify k endorsing local sensors; (c). The energy cost for the remote sensor to verify k
endorsing local sensors.
between the ﬁres of the timer predominantly accounts for the sensor discovery
delay. We can reduce this time duration by setting a higher timer frequency.
The total endorsing time is presented in Fig. 5(a) (solid line). Apparently, the
expensive local authentication dominates other delays. However, because k local
sensor authenticate the user in parallel, the total endorsing time is practical and
not much longer than the local authentication delay. When k = 16, it only takes
16.7 seconds for the user to get all endorsements.
Once receiving user’s remote access request, the remote sensor has to verify
whether the user is endorsed by k local sensors. To do so, the remote sensor
reconstructs k MACs by plugging the group ID into its own share of polynomial.
After k MACs are reconstructed, the remote sensor then generates and veriﬁes
the digest. In the experiment, we measure the time duration for the remote sensor
to do the veriﬁcation with k =4 ,5,···,16 endorsing sensors. The experiment
results are shown in Fig. 5(b)(c).
Finally, we estimate the total time for a user to be authenticated for remote
data access. Suppose the network requires the user to get 16 endorsing sensors
to access a remote sensor. First, the user has to get local authentication by all 16
local sensors and receive corresponding MACs. This procedure costs 16.7 seconds
according to Fig. 5(a). Then, the remote sensor needs 283ms to reconstruct and
verify 16 MACs. In total, a remote access with 16 local sensor endorsement will
cost around 17 seconds. Note that our estimation does not include the message
traveling time from the user to the remote sensor and then back to the user.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we show our eﬀort in designing access control scheme for sensor net-
works.We describe ourlocal accesscontroland remoteaccess controlunder a very
realistic adversary model. We implement the protocols on a TelosB mote testbed.
The securityandperformanceanalysisandthe experimentalresultsshowthat our
accesscontrolisfeasibleforrealapplication.Wearecurrentlyintheprocessofdoing
more experiments and designing more schemes for access control for comparison.320 H. Wang and Q. Li
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